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PRIVACY: DRUG USE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
-Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) prob. juris.
noted sub nom., Whalen v. Roe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1976).
In Roe v. Ingraham,' the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that sections of the New York
Public Health Law2 requiring reporting of names and addresses of
persons receiving prescriptions for specific drugs to a central data
bank were unconstitutional in that they intruded upon and interferred with the constitutional right of privacy inherent in the doctorpatient relationship. The decision extends the constitutional right
of privacy beyond the range thus far established by the United
States Supreme Court and appears to protect a different kind of
privacy from that which the Court has found protected under the
Constitution.3 While the Court has protected a right of privacy in a
line of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,' this kind of
privacy, perhaps better termed "personal autonomy," can be distinguished from the right of privacy protected in the instant case,
5
which might better be termed "the right of selective disclosure."
I.

THE INGRAHAM DECISION

6
The New York Public Health Law classifies drugs into five
1. 403 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom., Whalen v. Roe, 44
1253:
U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976). The plaintiffs have appealed under 28 U.S.C. §
Direct appeals from decisions of three-judge courts.
2. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH §§ 3330, 3331(6), 3332(2)(a), 3334(4) (McKinney 1971).
3. The United States Constitution contains no express reference to the right to privacy,
but the Court has inferred its existence from several amendments to the Constitution, includof Rights; and
ing the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments; the penumbras of the Bill
381 U.S. 479
the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut,
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5. Elisabeth L. Beardsley's article Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure,
as Beardsley],
PRIVACY 56 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1971), [hereinafter referred to
develops the clarifying terminology. The writer of Note, On Privacy: ConstitutionalProtecin
tion for PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973), terms selective disclosure "privacy
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7
information about them is to be communicated to others." A. WESTIN, PRIVACY & FREEDOM
(1967).
6. The state has the power to regulate the health of its populace. "The enactment and
in
enforcement of health measures find ample support in the police power which is inherent
to
powers
broad
has
state
a
that
elemental
is
"It
(1968).
1
§
Health
the state." 39 AM. JUR.
of everyone
establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health
U.S. 442,
there. It is a vital part of a state's police powers." Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347
449 (1954).
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schedules. Schedule II drugs are useful in pain relief and behavior
modification, but have a high potential for abuse.7 The state is to
furnish Schedule II prescription forms to physicians. Among other
data, the numbered forms require reporting of the name and address
of the patient. The professional filling the prescription, whether
physician or pharmacist, is to mail a copy of the form to a computer
center of the State Bureau of Controlled Substances, Licensing and
Evaluation. The state's interest in the reporting requirement is the
prohibition of over-prescribing and overbuying, forgeries, and counterfeit prescriptions, with consequent diversion of Schedule II drugs
to illegal uses.8 In twenty months of operation, only two names were
discovered that merited investigation; one was cleared, the other
was still being investigated at the time of the trial of this case.'
When the plaintiffs" first sought relief from the reporting requirements, the complaint was dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
with instructions to the district court judge to request convening of
a three-judge court." After denial of motions for a preliminary injunction and for dismissal,' 3 a three-judge court heard the case.
At trial, plaintiffs expressed fears they would be stigmatized by
having their names in a drug-related computer file. Some testified
they had sought alternative treatment or sources of supply to avoid
having their names recorded as having received Schedule II drugs. 4
Although the court declined to deal with the issue, there appeared
7. E.g., ritalin, codeine, Percodan, morphine, Hycodan. 403 F. Supp. at 933.
8. Id. at 934.
9. Id.
10. Plaintiffs were:
three infants receiving prescriptions for medications listed under Schedule II, two
physicians who prescribe drugs listed under that schedule, and the Empire State
Physicians Guild, Inc. A post-operative cancer patient who receives Hycodan and
Percodan, both Schedule I drugs, and a woman suffering from migraine who receives
Demerol, a physician who prescribes for one of these patients, and the American
Federation of Physicians and Dentists were permitted to intervene as plaintiffs and
also to file a separate complaint. 480 F.2d 102, 104 (1973).
The physicians claimed infringement of their right to prescribe treatment solely on the
basis
of medical considerations. 480 F.2d 102, 104 (1973). They were asserting not merely the
rights
of their patients, but an independent violation of protected constitutional rights. The
doctors
were granted standing to sue in line with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Physicians
Guild's claims were taken to be repetitive of the doctors' and standing to sue on behalf
of its
members was granted. 364 F. Supp. at 540 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This grant of standing
is
consistent with present Supreme Court standards. See, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
44
U.S.L.W. 5197, 5200 (U.S. July 1, 1976).
11. 357 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12. 480 F. 2d 102 (2d Cir. 1973).
13. 364 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
14. 403 F. Supp. at 934-35.
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to be a basis for fears that the computer records might not remain
confidential.'"
The district court held that the doctor-patient relationship is
one of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional protection.'" Noting that the right of privacy is limited by compelling state interests,
the court held that the regulatory scheme had a needlessly broad
7
sweep and that the state did not have a compelling interest' in
learning the names and addresses of those who had received Schedule II drugs.'" The district court found reporting of names and addresses for computerization and instant retrieval entirely different
from old regulations'9 that had allowed inspection of pharmacists'
shop records and rejected the state's argument that the new regula20
intrusion
tions did no more than the old. The court held that the
2'
greater."
is
impact
its
immediate,
was "not only more
I.

ANALYSIS

The Content of the Constitutional Right of Privacy
The cases cited by the court in Roe v. Ingraham as establishing
a constitutional right of personal privacy or a "guarantee of certain
22
areas or zones of privacy" define a particular kind of right which
some authorities have referred to as a right of "personal autonomy."
This right, perhaps unfortunately termed "privacy" by the Supreme
Court, can be distinguished from the right to restrict what one reveals of his personal affairs, which is best termed the "right of

A.

15. The matter of privacy within the data bank, best referred to as "record confidentiality" is unrelated to the constitutional right of privacy, but is protected by the privacy tort of
public disclosure of private facts. For a useful article on record confidentiality in a medical
treatment context, see, Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy: The
Emerging Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 37 (1975).
16. 403 F. Supp. at 936.
17. For a state to interfere with a right deemed to be "fundamental," such as the
constitutional right of privacy, the traditional test has been to determine whether there was
a "compelling state interest" in limiting the right. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 15463 (1973); and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n. 11 (1969).
18. 403 F. Supp. at 937.
19. The plaintiffs conceded their rights were not violated by former Public Health Law
§ 3301(32) (McKinney 1971) requiring prescriptions for narcotic drugs to bear the full name
and address of the patient, and the name, address, registration number and signature of the
physician; or by former Public Health Law § 3322(1)(c) requiring pharmacists to retain copies
of prescriptions for two years; or by former Public Health Law §§ 3322(1)(c) and 3334(1)
allowing inspection of the prescriptions by state and federal law enforcement authorities as
well as by the Department of Health.
20. 403 F. Supp. at 938.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 935. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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selective disclosure." In each of the principal cases cited by the
district court as establishing a constitutional right of privacy, there
had been a governmental attempt to regulate personal activities,
not an attempt to get acquainted with them.23 In each, the Court
dealt with whether the state could regulate the activity, not whether
the state was entitled to be advised that it was occurring.
This line of privacy cases beginning with Griswold, then, protects a right to do what one wishes in some kinds of circumstances
without unwarranted prohibition by the state. But, the Court has
yet to protect "privacy in the strong sense"; i.e., to establish any
right and set any limits to selective disclosure of personal information to the state. Ingrahamrefers to concurring and dissenting opinions in California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz24 as supporting a right
of privacy in the sense of selective disclosure, but Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion does not lend support to this right, and defers
judgment to other branches of government on collection of data
when a tenable law enforcement justification can be made. 5 The
reporting statute was upheld in CaliforniaBankers Ass'n.; thus, no
precedential limit was established by the Court as to the state's
right to collect data.
Although the plaintiffs in Ingraham testified that they had altered their intended behavior as a result of the law, they had altered
it not because of any statutory prohibition (for there is no such
prohibition on prescribing or receiving Schedule II drugs), but be23. See, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (having an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (advising and accepting an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(receiving a contraceptive device by an unmarried person); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557
(1969)(viewing obscenity in the solitude of one's home); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1
(1967)(marrying one of a different race); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (prescribing and receiving a contraceptive device).
24. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
25. While Justice Douglas in dissent makes a constitutional right of privacy argument
against the regulations, Justices Powell and Blackmun, concurring with the majority,
say
only that "[flinancial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations,
and beliefs. At some point, governmental intrusion upon those areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy." 416 U.S. at 78-9. The majority opinion in CaliforniaBankers
Ass'n. treats the case strictly as a fourth amendment (search and seizure) and fifth amendment (self-incrimination) case and does not base its decision on the constitutional right
of
privacy. Fourth amendment search and seizure cases involving government eavesdropping,
e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
clearly concern a different protection from the right protected as the constitutional right
of
privacy. Had Ingraham arisen with a fact situation involving a prescription user accused
of
a crime where the prosecution sought to introduce the prescription form into evidence,
it
would have been a much different case.
For further guidance on problems involving a conflict between the constitutional right
of privacy and the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination, see, Annot.,
43
L.Ed. 2d 871, 893 (1976).
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cause of requirements which merely report permitted behavior. It
does not appear that a majority of the Court has ever protected the
right of selective disclosure as an aspect of the constitutional right
of privacy. If the Supreme Court upholds the rule of this case, then
the constitutional right of privacy will be greatly expanded, extending beyond protection of autonomy to protection of refusal to reveal
information about oneself even when the information does not concern prohibited behavior.2 6
Two rights described as "privacy" in constitutional law have
been discussed so far: the right of personal autonomy and the right
of selective disclosure."1 There is a third kind of right or rights which
is the collection of causes of action in tort that goes by the name of
"privacy," including the rights to be free from intrusion by others,
public disclosure of private facts, placement in a false light, and
commercial exploitation." Perhaps the court would have been well
advised to treat the matter as a tort case and deal frankly with the
plaintiffs' expressed fears of public disclosure of the reported facts.
The injury would lie in the fact that many members of the public
would find the taking of behavior-modifying drugs immoral, even
29
though the use of such drugs was not illegal. Perhaps issuance of
an order to the state to either operate its data bank so that it is
perfectly secure or cease collection of data until such security is
a proper and adequate remedy to deal
established would have been
3
1
with the plaintiffs' fears.
26. A similar case makes the same extension at the district court level. Merriken v.
Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973), found a drug abuse questionaire for public school
students to be a violation of the constitutional right of privacy inherent in a family situation.
27. Beardsley, supra note 4, at 65 argues that the right of selective disclosure is but
what
another aspect of the right of personal autonomy: that one has the right to determine
abortion.
an
have
will
she
whether
determine
to
right
she will disclose just as one has the
But, in the context of this case, it seems more correct to view the two rights as being on
that
different levels. The right to do an act is on a different level from the right not to reveal
of
the act has been done. Ingraham is concerned with communication about the commission
relationThe
beliefs.
personal
of
communication
from
different
acts. That is fundamentally
arena of
ship between autonomy and selective disclosure may be less distinguishable in the
Research
Students
Law
See,
discussion.
this
to
pertinent
not
is
that
but
believes,
what one
Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
28. See, W. PROSSEB, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 802-18 (4th ed. 1971).
29. Too, as the court of appeals noted, "most people simply do not want their ailments
generally known." Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 108 n.7 (1973).
from
30. In Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.C. 1971), the FBI was enjoined
in its
public dissemination of fingerprint and arrest records, but was allowed to keep them
Note,
files for use in law enforcement. For discussion of Menard read as a privacy case, see
Right to
Constitutional Law-Maintenance & Dissemination of Records of Arrest versus the
Privacy, 17 WAYNE L. Rzv. 995 (1971).
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B.

The Zone of Privacy to be Protected
Roe v. Wade3' was read as holding implicitly and Doe v. Bol3
2
ton as holding explicitly that the doctor-patient relationship is one
of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional protection. 3 The
Ingraham court cited Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Roe as
support.34 However, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roe,
did not need to find a doctor-patient relationship as the zone of
privacy protected, for he said "this right of privacy . . .is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 31 The woman's own body seems the more likely
zone for the right in Roe than the doctor-patient relationship. 3
Alan F. Westin 37 explains four states of privacy: solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reservation of information about oneself.,
Tort law protects all of these. The right to freedom from intrusion
protects solitude, intimacy, and reservation of information about
oneself. The rights to freedom from public disclosure of private facts
and commercial exploitation especially protect anonymity; i.e., the
right to choose to be nothing but a face in the crowd.
The constitutional right of privacy explained in Griswold and
Roe seems to be applied to protect solitude and intimacy; that is,
to protect one's autonomy to do what he wishes in solitude or in an
intimate relationship with another without undue intrusion and interference by the state. In Stanley v. Georgia31 the right protected
was one strictly of solitude. It is questionable whether even Griswold
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
33. 403 F. Supp. at 936.
34. Id.
35. 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
36. While the woman's own body seems the more logical zone, the Court has not yet
made that clear. The latest decision on abortion and the right of privacy, Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 44 U.S.L.W. 5197 (U.S. July 1, 1976), continues to mention the doctor-patient
relationship: "It is true that Doe and Roe clearly establish that the state may not
restrict
the decision of the patient and her physician regarding abortion during the first stage
of
pregnancy." 44 U.S.L.W. at 5201. However, in reference to the role of a woman's spouse
in
the decision to terminate pregnancy, the Court declares that "The woman is the one primarily
concerned .... " 44 U.S.L.W. at 5201. It seems clear, too, that the woman is the key
person
in the joint decision by her doctor and her with respect to abortion, for he is employed
to
carry out her decision. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals read Doe v. Bolton as "recognizing a pregnant woman's constitutional right to make the abortion decision on the basis
of
advice from her own physician." Roe v. Ingraham 480 F. 2d 102, 107 (1973) (emphasis added).
37. Westin, Science, Privacy & Freedom: Issues & Proposalsfor the 1970's, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1003, 1020-22 (1966).
38. Solitude differs from intimacy in that solitude is the privacy that inheres in one's
person while intimacy is the privacy that inheres in a relationship with another person.
Id.
at 1020-26.
39. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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involved, at its heart, an intimate relationship, rather than the right
of the individual to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion.",
Since the constitutional right of privacy does not require an intimate relationship, for solitude is also worthy of protection, all the
Ingraham court needed to consider was the solitude of the patient
in filling the prescription.
The law in question requires reporting by one filling the patient's prescription. The patient's privacy is not intruded upon until
he chooses to fill the prescription, for the law does not become
operative until that time. 4' The doctor-patient relationship, a relationship of intimacy which the Ingraham court holds to be the protected zone of privacy, is simply not necessary to either constitutional protection of the patient's own privacy or to the Ingraham
holding that the patient's right of privacy had been violated.
C.

The Test to be Applied, If Any

Were it true, as the Ingraham court believed, that a constitutional right of privacy in the sense of selective disclosure was protected in California Bankers Ass'n., then it would appear that the
court applied too strict a test to the Public Health Law. The law
was struck down because the state failed to show a compelling inter2
est in gathering name and address data. The California Bankers
Ass'n. plurality opinion would accept data collection laws when a
43
tenable law enforcement justification can be made. Perhaps the
40. It appears the Court in Griswold may have intended "intimacy" to include both
solitude and a relationship with another person. The confusion is clarified in Eisenstadt:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child. (emphasis in original) (Brennan, J., for the Court in Eisenstadt). 405 U.S. at
453.
41. Stretching the point, if one considers the use of a stolen prescription form, there is
no need for a doctor-patient relationship at all for the solitude of the person giving the form
to a pharmacist to be compromised by the law. Even one caught by the computer in this
situation would seem to obtain little fourth amendment assistance from California Bankers
Ass'n.
42. 403 F. Supp. at 938.
43. The stated purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970's transaction reporting requirement is to obtain information having a "high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulaThe
tory investigations or proceedings." 12 U.S.C. § 1829 b (a)(2); 31 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
Court said:
The [reporting] regulations are sufficiently tailored so as to single out transactions
found to have the greatest potential for such circumvention and which involve substantial amounts of money. They are therefore reasonable in light of that statutory purpose
and consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 416 U.S. at 63.
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limited success of the New York program does show a lack of compelling interest, but it is questionable whether the legislature's lawenforcement justification is unreasonable. If California Bankers
Ass'n. is the precedent for protection of this sense of privacy, "compelling state interest" demands too much of the state. And, if
CaliforniaBankers Ass'n. can be read as establishing selective disclosure as a protected right, it does so with a lesser standard than
that for protecting autonomy.
D. A Difference in Mechanics, Not Rights
In requiring reporting of data for computerization, the state
argued unsuccessfully that it was doing no more than it had under
an old law" that required pharmacists to maintain name and address information at their stores for inspection by state agents. The
Ingraham court found a distinction in that "the intrusion here is not
only more immediate, its impact is greater." 45 This is a distinction
without a legal difference. Under the old law, disclosure was still
required; it just cost the state more to collect the data. The legal
relationship between the state and the patient's privacy was no
different; only the mechanics of collection were different. Once the
state can compel access to the data, it makes no difference to the
patient's privacy how the state collects and deals with the data, so
long as the information is not disclosed to persons outside the Bureau.
III.

IMPACT OF THE LATEST SUPREME COURT PRIVACY CASE

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth"° would seem to severely
weaken the precedential value of Ingraham. Planned Parenthood
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Missouri abortion statute. 7 Two physicians and the Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri organization brought the suit. The recordkeeping and
reporting statute sections upheld as constitutional" require hospitals and doctors to keep confidential abortion records on statesupplied forms which may be inspected by public health officers.
The stated purpose and function of the requirements are:
Even allowing an interpretation of the case as based on the constitutional right of privacy,
the Court used the lesser test of "reasonableness" rather than of "compelling interest."
44. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH §§ 3301(32), 3 3 22(1)(c), 3334(1) (McKinney 1971).
45. 403 F. Supp at 938.
46. 44 U.S.L.W. 5197 (U.S. July 1, 1976).
47. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.010-.085 (Vernon Supp. 1974).
48. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.055 (Vernon Supp. 1974).
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the preservation of maternal health and life by adding to the sum
of medical knowledge through the compilation of relevant maternal
health and life data and to monitor all abortions performed to assure
that they are done only under and in accordance with the provisions
of the law.49
It is not clear from the statute whether the forms may ask the
name of the patient or whether the form which the state supplied
required the identity of the patient. However, one provision of the
abortion law that the forms were intended to enforce is a requirement of written consent to abortion by the patient and her husband
or parents.5 It would be difficult to keep a record of such written
consents without names.
The Court made reference to "privacy":
Recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible. This is
surely so for the period after the first stage of pregnancy, for then the
that
state may enact substantive as well as recordkeeping regulations
51
health.
maternal
protecting
of
are reasonable means
It appears, though, that the Court was concerned with "privacy"
not in the sense of selective disclosure, but in the sense of autonomy,
for later the Court stated "we see no legally significant impact or
consequence on the abortion decision or on the physician-patient
relationship."5 2 The impact of the reporting regulations on the patient's right to decide to have an abortion seemed to be the major
concern of the Court when it spoke of "privacy." However, even if
Planned Parenthood is read to protect the right of selective disclosure, the test for the regulations is not Ingraham's"compelling state
interest," but that they merely be "reasonably directed" to the
legislative purpose.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE

Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Griswold specifically dec49. Id.
50. Consent of the patient was held to be a reasonable requirement. Mo. ANN. STAT. §
188.020(3) (spousal consent), § 188.020(4)(parental consent for minors) were held to be unconstitutional interferences with the patient's constitutional right of privacy. The reporting
requirements are also intended to aid in enforcement of other aspects of the abortion law,
such as the requirement that abortions shall be performed only "[bly a duly licensed,
consenting physician in the exercise of his best clinical, medical judgment." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.020 (1).
51. 44 U.S.L.W. at 5205.
52. Id. at 5206.
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lined a substantive due process approach to the case,5 : declaring
that the Court is not a super-legislature. But, in the future, it might
be more consistent if a case such as Ingraham were approached on
a substantive due process basis rather than on a privacy argument.5 4
One would argue that the right to control access to personal information is a substantive liberty protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment." In light of the fact that the appellant's argument in Roe v. Wade was partly based on substantive due
process and the Court's opinion in part accepted that argument,"
and in light of Justice Stewart's concurring opinion which finds that
the rights the Court mentions under "privacy" are protected by the
due process clause,57 this might be a wise line of attack. Most recent
support for a substantive due process attack appears in Planned
Parenthood in which the Court showed no reluctance to act as a
super-legislature and overrule the determination of the Missouri
legislature that saline aminocentesis was unsafe and should be prohibited as a means of abortion.51 Pursuing a substantive due process
attack, the plaintiff would show lack of valid governmental purpose
and relevant need for all the information requested by the state.
The holding in Ingraham is unwarranted. It is based on an
incorrect understanding of precedent. By protecting "privacy" in
the sense of selective disclosure, the decision is out of line with
Supreme Court cases recognizing a constitutional right of "privacy"
in the sense of personal autonomy. If the Supreme Court sustains
the holding, then the constitutional right of privacy will be significantly expanded. 9

Dennis C. Brown
53. Justice Douglas specifically rejected Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as
the Court had in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
54. Alternatively, one could approach the matter as a privacy case in tort, as suggested
at p. 131, supra. That would not put the constitutional question squarely, but might provide
adequate relief.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
56. 410 U.S. at 164.
57. Id. at 167.
58. 44 U.S.L.W. at 5204-5.
59. If such is the case, then the constitutional right of privacy will be well on its way to
becoming the same muddled collection of causes of action as are presently lumped together
under the tort law of "privacy." A better course would be for the Court to abandon the
"privacy" label altogether, and either utilize substantive due process in both
autonomy and
selective disclosure cases or use such distinct titles as autonomy and selective disclosure for
the two distinct rights. It appeared for a time that the Court was on its way toward abandoning the "privacy" title. In Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Justice
Stewart's majority opinion cited most of the principal privacy cases as precedent, but did
not use the word "privacy." The decision's basis was substantive due process. Privacy, however, with respect to the challenged reporting requirements, is the basis for decision in the
latest case, Planned Parenthood.
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